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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-174

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
FINAL DISPOSITION
THEORDORE McLEOD, JRV
Defendant
By Decision and Order dated January 3, 2003, this court found that defendant
Theodore McLeod violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act as alleged in count I of the
complaint.

By separate order, the court perm anently enjoined Mr. McLeod from

organizing, prom oting or participating in The Car Club or any other illegal lottery in
the State of Maine, including any schemes sim ilar to The Car Club w hich require the
recruitm ent of an infinite num ber of individuals to succeed. Other rem edies sought b y
the plaintiff were held in abeyance pending an accounting by Mr. McLeod and further
development of the money trail.
Mr. McLeod initially objected to p ro v id in g an accounting of the funds he
received through The Car Clubs, suggesting that to do so m ight expose him to criminal
penalties. The plaintiff countered with a motion for contempt. Ultimately, Mr. McLeod
did file an affidavit indicating that he had collected a total of $29,500 from various
individuals, which he turned over to Sidney A ndrew s of H erm on, Maine. As it turns
out, Mr. A ndrew s died of lung cancer shortly after the events w hich gave rise to this
litigation, and his personal representative testified at a subsequent hearing that there
was no cash in the estate or other indications of a recent w indfall.

N or did Mr.

Andrews give any extensive funds to his girlfriend of 27 years, Jackie Knowlton.

A t h e a rin g there w as also testim ony from a Louis Lachance w ho testified
convincingly that Mr. Andrews had shown him a substantial am ount of m oney which
Andrews represented as having won. After considering all of the evidence presented at
the time of trial and during subsequent dispositional proceedings, the court finds it
likely that Mr. McLeod conveyed at least a portion of the funds which he had received
from the victims of The Car Club scheme to Mr. Andrews, b u t it is also likely that he
did not convey the entire $29,500. From the beginning, this court has been skeptical
that Mr. McLeod w ould receive no personal benefit from organizing and prom oting
The Car Clubs. The court does not find it likely that Mr. McLeod w ould do all of this
work out of the goodness of his heart and w ith no expectation of any profit for himself,
when the entire scheme is based upon individual greed.
In order to obtain disgorgement of profits, the plaintiff w ould have to prove that
Mr. McLeod personally benefited from the scheme. This is n o t necessarily true w ith
regard to an order of restitution, which focuses on those people w ho have been
victimized by the defendant's activities. Therefore, the court is going to order partial
restitution to those victims, in addition to a civil penalty and paym ent of the plaintiffs
cost of litigation. The entry will be:
(1)
This court's order dated January 3, 2003, enjoining Mr. McLeod
from certain activities is CONTINUED indefinitely.
(2)
Theodore McLeod is ORDERED to pay restitution in the am ount of
$15,000 for the prorata benefit of victims, of The Car Club as revealed by
testim ony in this case. This restitution fund shall be adm inistered by the
Office of the A ttorney General.
(3)

A civil penalty of $5,000 is ASSESSED against Mr. McLeod.

(4)
Mr. McLeod is further ORDERED to pay the plaintiff's attorney's
fees in the am ount of $4,000 plus other
' ^ ™ ^ "0.
S. Kim JLUU3U U.p
Justice, Superior Court
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STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-174

KENNEBEC, ss.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

ORDER

V.

THEODORE McLEOD, JR.,
Defendant
By separate Judgm ent and Order, defendant Theodore McLeod, Jr. has been
found to have intentionally participated in unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of commerce w hich is unlawful. These acts occurred during Me. McLeod's
participation in, organization a n d / or prom otion of The Car Club, w hich is a pyram id
scheme. Based upon these findings set forth in the separate Judgm ent, the court enters
the following order:
Theodore McLeod, Jr. is perm anently enjoined from organizing,
prom oting or participating in The Car Club or any other illegal lottery in
the State of Maine. This order includes an y scheme sim ilar to The Car
Club in that it requires the recruitm ent of an infinite n u m b er of
individuals to succeed.

Dated: Tanuarv ¿v , 2003
S.

KiiJV J L U U 3 U

up

Justice, Superior Court
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-174

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

DECISION AND ORDER
THEODORE McLEOD, JR.,
Defendant
This m atter came on for trial before the court w ithout a jury on the complaint of
the State of Maine, Office of the Attorney General against defendant Theodore McLeod,
Jr. alleging that he violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), 5 M.R.S.A. §§
205-A-215 (Supp. 2001).1 After fully considering the unrebutted testimonial and other
evidence p resented, the court concludes that the A ttorney G eneral is entitled to
judgm ent, and injunctive and other remedies.
Facts
This case arises from a "get rich quick" scheme, w hich circulated through
Penobscot C ounty in the Spring of 2001. The scheme was know n by a variety of
nam es, including "The Car Club." Actually, due to the structure of the scheme, there 1

1 The Attorney General had also originally charged McLeod with a violation of 17 M.R.S.A.
§ 2305, which outlaws pyramid schemes as being lotteries and declares a violation of the section to also
be an unfair trade practice. Section 2305 also provides, "Whoever shall organize or participate in any
such lottery by organizing or inducing membership in any such group or organization shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than 11 months, or by both." Faced with McLeod's constitutional demand for
a jury trial in light of the clearly criminal nature of the statute, the Attorney General dismissed the
second count of the complaint which included the section 2305 allegation. Nor did the Attorney
General bring other charges under the Criminal Code, e.g., aggravated unlawful gambling, 17-A
M.R.S.A. § 953, or seek an injunction for unlawful gambling under that title, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 958.
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w ould be a series of clubs in a stream. Each club is organized as a "car racing team"
w ith a driven two crew chiefs, four pit crew members, and eight fans. The fans are the
lowest level of the club and attain m em bership by giving $5,000 each to the driver.
W hen the driver has received his $40,000, the team splits into two new teams w ith the
two crew chiefs becom ing the drivers, half of the original pit crew m oving up to the
position of crew chiefs, half the original fans m oving up to the pit crew, leaving eight
new fan positions to be recruited of the two new teams. The process continues when
the new fans all make their $5,000 gifts to the new drivers, and all of the participants
move up the ladder again in four new teams. In theory, a fan can move from his
position as a $5,000 donor to a $40,000 recipient on the fourth division. As testified to
by Professor William Soule (and as further explained in Pacurib v. Villacruz, 7 05 N.Y.S.2d
819, 823 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1999)), this means that for any of the original eight fans to
reap the $35,000 profit, at least 120 total fans w ould have to have given their $5,000 to
the "drivers." In other w ords, there is a constant and constantly increasing dem and for
new fans in order to m ake the clubs work. Eventually, and this could hap p en quite
quickly, the club collapses due to the lack of new fans and at this point, according to
Professor Soule, the situation is extremely unfair because the last three levels recruited
into the clubs cannot recover their losses.
D efendant McLeod w as both active and prom inent in the organization and
prom otion of the car clubs. A lthough his name does not appear as one of the drivers,
McLeod hosted recruiting gatherings at his garage and m ade prom otional speeches to
gatherings there and elsewhere. According to the witnesses, these speeches included
representations that The Car Club was not an illegal pyram id scheme, that an attorney
had been retained to guarantee the legality and keep up w ith rules and regulations, that
2

m embers could get out of the organization at any time and that McLeod kept a fund to
provide refunds to those w ho w ished to leave.

M ost im portant, all four of the

witnesses testified that they physically gave their $5,000 "gift" as new fans to McLeod
himself.
Discussion
Based on the facts set forth above, it is clear to the court that the car clubs
organized in Penobscot County and in which the defendant played an active role, w ere
p a rt of a pyram id scheme.

If the State had continued to p u rsu e this m atter as a

violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305, there w ould be m ore than a sufficient factual basis for a
fact finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that this was a pyram id scheme w hich
violated that section of the statute. However, the fact that the State has elected not to
proceed criminally through either Title 17 or 17-A, does not foreclose a finding of unfair
trad e practice under the UTPA.

The representations McLeod m ade during his

prom otional speeches w ere them selves u n tru e and an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in the conduct of commerce, w hich is declared unlaw ful in 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
McLeod stated that the club was legal and not a prohibited pyram id scheme, when he
knew or should have know n to the contrary. McLeod represented that an attorney h ad
certified to the legality of the scheme, w hen no reputable attorney could come to th at
conclusion. Finally, McLeod's representations that members could get out of the club at
any time and be reim bursed their investment from a fund which he had set up was also
a p p aren tly false since he refused to reim burse any of the four w itnesses th eir
investm ent upon their requests. In sum m ary, the court finds an d concludes th at
defendant McLeod violated the UTPA through his prom otional activities for the car
clubs. Judgm ent will be for the plaintiff on count I of the complaint.
3

The State seeks a variety of rem edies including a perm anent injunction, an
accounting, restitution, a civil penalty and its costs of investigation including attorney's
fees. The court will issue a perm anent injunction by separate order. As authorized in 5
M.R.S.A. § 209, since the court is issuing a perm anent injunction, it will exercise its
discretion to order defendant McLeod to pay the State the cost of the investigation by
the A ttorney General and the cost of suit, upon filing by the A ttorney General of an
affidavit detailing those costs. Other remedies will require further development.
D efendant M cLeod argues against orders of restitu tio n or disgorgem ent
pointing out the lack of evidence that he personally gained from any of the car clubs
and, even if he had, the law discourages courts from enforcing illegal contracts. As to
the second point, none of the cases cited by the defendant involved claims under the
UTPA. While the defendant is correct that generally the law will not enforce illegal
contracts, that does not m ean that the court is p rev en ted from ordering either
restitution or disgorgem ent or both -- which are not enforcement of a contract —in the
context of a UTPA case. Restitution focuses on m aking w hole the victim of some illegal
activity, while disgorgem ent focuses on preventing a w rongdoer from profiting from
his w rongdoing w ithout a focus on individual victims. In either case, it is im portant to
have the defendant account for not only the $20,000 w hich the witnesses have placed in
his hands, but all car club funds w hich have come th ro u g h his hands.

Such an

accounting was requested in the original com plaint and is w ithin the legal tool box
available to the court.
W ith regard to the Attorney General's request for civil penalties, those penalties
are available under 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, but only if the A ttorney General proves that the
violations of section 207 w ere intentional and unfair or deceptive. As set forth above,
4

the court makes those findings. However, since the am ount of such penalties, if any,
m ay depend in p art on the size of any restitution or disgorgem ent, the court will
reserve ruling on these issues until after the accounting has taken place.
For the reasons stated above, the entry will be:
(1)

The defendant's oral Motion for Judgm ent as a M atter of Law is

DENIED.
(2)

Judgm ent for the plaintiff on count I.

(3)

The defendant is declared to have intentionally com m itted

an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of commerce. The
defendant will be enjoined from such further acts by separate order.
(4)

The defendant is ORDERED to file w ith the court w ithin

thirty (30) days a full accounting of the receipt and expenditure of all funds
in w hatever form w hich he has received in connection w ith any of the car
clubs. Entries for funds obtained from Mr. N ylund, Mr. W atters, Mr.
Spaulding, and Mr. Hanscomb and their disposition should be highlighted.
(5)

The court will retain jurisdiction to order fu rth er UTPA

remedies upon receipt of the defendant's accounting.
(6)

The State is aw arded the A ttorney G eneral's investigation

expenses and costs of litigation, including attorney's fees, in an am ount to
be determ ined after filing of an affidavit of such costs and fees.

Dated: January ^ , 2003
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court
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Michele Garwood,
Administrative Clerk

Nancy A. Desjardin,
Clerk of Court

Clerk’s Office
Kennebec County Superior Court
95 State Street
Augusta, ME 04330
(207) 622-9357

Date:

Docket No.

Cv o i- i 74

1 / 3/03

state of maine vs . Theodore mgleod

NOTICE TO COUNSEL:
Now that your case is finished you have ten (10 ) days after the 21 day
appeal period, to ciaim your exhibits and/or record or they will be disposed
of. In the event your case is to be appealed, please notify our office. At the
conslusion of your appeal you will have ten (10) days to claim your exhibits
and/or record.
Please note there will be no further reminders to claim your exhibits and/or
record in your case. The Clerk’s office will not mail any of the above. It is
the responsibility of the parties to arrange for pick up.
EXHIBITS/POSTERS

R egional O ffices:

84 Harlow S t ,, 2 nd F loor
B angor, M aine 04401
T el: (207) 941-3070
F ax : (207) 941-3075

G . S teven R owe
ATTORNEY GENERAL

44 O ak Street, 4th F loor
P ortland, M aine 04101-3014
T el: (207) 822-0260
F ax : (207) 822-0259

S tate of M aine
O ffice o f the A ttorney G eneral
6 S tate H ouse S tation
A ugusta , M aine 04333-0006

Telephone: (20 7 ) 6 2 6 -8 8 0 0
TDD: (20 7 ) 6 2 6 -8 8 6 5

TDD: (877) 428-8800
128 S weden S t ., S te . 2
C aribou, M aine 04736
T el : (207) 496-3792
F ax: (207) 496-3291

November 6, 2002

HAND DELIVERED
Nancy Desjardin, Clerk
Kennebec County Superior Court
95 State Street
Augusta, Maine 04330
Re:

State of Maine v. Theodore McLeod, Jr.
Civil Action Docket No. CV-01-174

Dear Ms. Desjardin:
Enclosed please find the State’s Post Trial Brief in the above-referenced matter,
along with copies of three cases cited in the Brief. Thank you for your assistance.

Linda J. Cohfi
Assistant Attorney General
Enclosures
LJC/ajm
cc:

Pasquale J. Penino, Jr., Esq.

Printed on Recycled Paper

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

THEODORE MCLEOD, JR.,
Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-174

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE’S POST TRIAL BRIEF

The trial in this case was held on October 28, 2002. The State proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, and the Court should find, that the Defendant Theodore McLeod, Jr.
(“McLeod”) violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (“the UTPA”), by
promoting a pyramid scheme. To remedy this violation, the Court should issue a permanent
injunction barring the Defendant from promoting a pyramid scheme, and order disgorgement and
restitution for consumers harmed by the Defendant’s unlawful practices, as well as civil penalties
and costs, including attorney’s fees.
FACTS
In the spring of 2001, Mr. McLeod promoted the Car Club at meetings in a warehouse in
Brewer. The Car Club is a classic pyramid scheme. It depends on the recruitment of an everincreasing number of new members who, theoretically by their voluntary gifts, enable
participants to pay $5,000 and receive a $40,000 payment for a net profit of $35,000. The Club
charts (State’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4) present a four level, three step pyramid with a driver at the
top, two crew chiefs beneath the driver position, four pit crew beneath them, and eight newly

recruited racing fans at the bottom. When the “gifting” process is complete, the driver is
removed from the sheet, and the remainder of the pyramid splits. Everyone advances up in rank,
and two new pyramids are formed, each containing a new driver, crew chief, and pit crew, all of
whom must then actively seek eight new recruits which enables the process to continue ad
infinitum to everyone’s monetary benefit, or so everyone is told. What is presented is thus not a
singular ever expanding pyramid, but one which spawns a chain of multiple ongoing pyramids,
each of which is linked to its predecessor.1
The witnesses in this case, Michael Watters, Kevin Nylund, Leon Spaulding, and Stanley
Hanscom, each invested $5,000 cash in order to receive a large payout in a short period of time.
The Defendant McLeod actively promoted the Club by speaking to large groups of people at a
warehouse in Brewer on numerous occasions. At these meetings, Mr. McLeod explained the
rules of the Club and invited people to join his racing team. He told people that the Club was
legal, that an attorney had been retained by the Club, and that they could get their money back
any time. Relying on these statements made by McLeod, as well as similar statements made by
others, Watters, Nylund, Spaulding, and Hanscom invested in the Club. They were directed to go
to Mr. McLeod’s garage in Hermon, Maine and to pay $5,000 to Mr. McLeod. On the appointed
day in early April of 2001, they went to Mr. McLeod’s garage and paid him $5,000 in cash each.
At that time, Mr. McLeod reiterated the Club rules, including statements that the Club was legal,
that it had a lawyer, and that money would be returned to people upon request. They all then left
and went to another meeting at the Brewer warehouse where Mr. McLeod again promoted the
Car Club to approximately 100 to 200 people.

1 This description o f a pyramid set forth in Pacurib v. Villacruz, 705 NYS.2d 819 (Ny.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1999) is a
very apt description o f the Car Club.
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Soon thereafter, or at about the same time, one of the witnesses, Leon Spaulding, began
promoting the pyramid at his place of business in Bangor, lowering the entrance fee from $5,000
to $1,000. Kevin Nylund and Stanley Hanscom each gave Spaulding $1,000 in this scheme.
Hanscom testified that he received a profit of $8,000 due to his $1,000 Car Club scheme. It is
undisputed that Watters and Nylund did not promote the scheme, did not recruit anyone, and did
not accept cash from anyone. Hanscom recruited Noor Khan. However, Hanscom did not take
money from Khan or anyone else, nor did he make any money on his investment in the $1,000 or
the $5,000 Car Clubs.
A.

McLeod Violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207,
The Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.. .in the conduct of any trade or

commerce.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 207. These terms are incapable of precise definition, so whether a
given practice is unfair or deceptive must be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v.
Shattuck, 2000 ME 38 1fl3, 747 A.2d 174.
Pyramid programs such as the Car Club, which induce a person to participate on the
representation that he or she cannot only regain the purchase price, but also reap profits by
recruiting others, are inherently deceptive and contrary to public policy. The deception arises
because the market eventually becomes saturated and the seemingly endless chain must end;
consequently, many participants cannot even recoup their investments, let alone make a profit.
As Professor Soule’s testimony demonstrates, the Car Club is such a scheme. Marketing
programs based on a pyramid principle similar to the Car Club have been found to violate
consumer protection statutes. Illinois ex rel. Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78, 82-83 (111. 1984).

3

B.

The Court Should Issue an Order Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 to Remedy
McLeod’s Violations of the UTPA.
The UTPA vests the trial court with considerable discretion to fashion an equitable

remedy once a finding of unlawful trade practices has been made, and the Court should and must
fashion an appropriate remedy to do complete justice. State v. Bob Chambers Ford, 522 A.2d
362, 366-367 (Me. 1987). Equitable remedies that may be applied in this case to do complete
justice include injunctive relief, accounting2, restitution and disgorgement. Once a Court finds
that the Defendant has violated the Unfair Trade Practice Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 allows the Court
to issue a permanent injunction against further violations and to order the Defendant to pay back
any monies obtained as a result of the unfair trade practice. The Attorney General may also seek
to recover civil penalties for intentional violations of the UTPA,3 and if a permanent injunction is
granted, the Court may also order that the defendant pay the Attorney General’s costs of
investigation and suit, including attorney fees.4 All of these remedies are necessary and
appropriate in this case.
The Attorney General requests that the Court find that Mr. McLeod violated the UTPA
by promoting the Car Club pyramid and issue a permanent injunction restraining Mr. McLeod
from promoting the Car Club or any similar scheme that requires recruitment of an infinite
number of individuals in order to succeed. Injunctive relief is appropriate and necessary in this
case to ensure that the Car Club does not start up again.

2 The Court has the equitable remedy o f an accounting at its disposal (27A Am. Jur.2d Equity § 99); see also State o f
Maine v. Richard, 1997 ME 144, 697 A.2d 410. To assist formulating appropriate judgment, the Court may order
the defendant to submit an accounting o f all his Car Club activities.
3 The State does not need to prove that the violation was intentional to obtain injunctive and other equitable relief.
Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 200-201 (Me. 1979); State o f Maine v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 365.
4 14 M.R.S.A. § 1522.
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Injunctive relief alone, however, will not deter others from attempting such a scheme, and
will not provide relief to those at the bottom of the pyramid who inevitably lost their money in
this scheme. The Court has equitable power to order monetary relief as restitution and or
disgorgement in addition to injunctive relief. Disgorgement and restitution are not mutually
exclusive. SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 598-599 (E. D. Pa. 1976). Even if the
Court orders full restitution of all monies lost by known victims of the scheme, it may also order
disgorgement of any wrongfully obtained money not paid out in restitution. Similarly, even if the
Court orders full disgorgement, if the disgorged funds do not adequately compensate those at the
bottom of the pyramid, the Court may also order additional payments as restitution.
Restitution is necessary in this case to compensate the victims5 and to deter future
pyramid schemes. The statutory language of section 209 provides for restitution as a remedy for
persons harmed by the Defendant’s UTPA violations. While Mr. McLeod may not have been
the person who initiated the “Car Club” and could be viewed as merely one of many participants
in the chain, an order requiring Mr. McLeod to pay restitution is not unfair as the amount that he
must pay in restitution is limited to the amount of gain that he received. People ex rel. Fahner v.
Walsh, 461 NE.2d 78, 85 (111. 1984).
The Defendant has argued that restitution is inappropriate in this case because the victims
have unclean hands. The unclean hands doctrine has no application to this case for two reasons.
First, the Defendant cannot raise the clean hands doctrine as a defense because he does not have
clean hands. Dudley v. Wyler, 647 A. 2d 90 (Me. 1994). Second, the maxim of clean hands
applies solely to some willful misconduct with reference to the matter in litigation and not to

5 Such a restitution order should apply to all consumers who paid the Defendant to join the Car Club and not be
limited to the consumers who testified at trial. State v. Ralph Williams Northwest Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d
423,437-439 (Wash. 1976)
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some other illegal transaction, although it may be indirectly connected with the subject matter of
the suit. Mason v. Carrothers, 74 A. 1030, 1037 (Me. 1909). Hanscom, Watters and Nylund did
not take money from others, and therefore do not have unclean hands. Any money that Spaulding
received was unrelated to his transaction with the Defendant.
In pari delicto is a corollary of the clean hands doctrine and means that where the wrong
of the one party equals the other, the Defendant is in the stronger position. The rule is often
applied between parties to an illegal transaction. 27A Am Jur.2d Equity § 132 (1996). In this
case, the party seeking restitution is the State of Maine which has clean hands, is not in pari
delicto, and which is authorized by 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 to recover restitution for consumers.
Therefore, neither in pari delicto nor the clean hands doctrine has any application to this action
brought by the Attorney General to enforce the UTPA.
Even if in pari delicto applies in this case, at least one court has allowed some recovery
to private litigants in a pyramid case. Where the parties appear not to have been in pari delicto,
the one whose wrong is less than that of the other may recover. Id., Pacurib v. Villacruz, 705
NYS.2d 819, 829-830 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1999). Pacurib involved a quite similar pyramid
scheme. The court found that Plaintiff and Defendant Villacruz were aggressive promoters and
therefore in pari delicto and denied Plaintiff recovery from Defendant Villacruz. However, the
Court also found that the conduct of Defendant Terez was more egregious than that of Plaintiff,
and therefore Defendant Terez was liable to return the Plaintiffs money. In this case, Defendant
McLeod’s conduct is more egregious than Waiter’s, Nylund’s, and Hanscom’s. They were not
aggressive promoters and themselves took no money from other participants. Therefore, McLeod
should pay them restitution. Even if the Court finds that Spaulding was in pari delicto with the
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Defendant, Mr. McLeod should not be permitted to profit by his own fraud or to take advantage
of his own wrong and retain the $5,000 given to him by Spaulding.
To do complete justice in this case, disgorgement is also necessary. Disgorgement is an
equitable remedy designed to deter future law violators and to deprive defendants of the proceeds
of their wrongful conduct. It takes into account the fact that the issuance of an injunction by itself
does not correct the consequences of past activities. Disgorgement contemplates total recovery
from the wrongdoer, whereas restitution may be limited to a few of the total number injured.
This Court should order Defendant McLeod to disgorge all of his Car Club profits to the State of
Maine. To the extent that the defendant is ordered to pay restitution, those amounts would serve
to offset part or all of a judgment for disgorgement. SEC v. Penn Central Co., 425 F.Supp. 593,
598-599 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
The Attorney General’s purpose in bringing this case, and other similar cases, was to stop
pyramids in Maine.6 In light of this extensive pyramid activity in the State of Maine, the
Attorney General is seeking injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement in this case. The
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 also provides that the Attorney General may
recover a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per violation for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices
Act which are intentional. In this case, a civil penalty is warranted because the Defendant’s
participation in the scheme was intentional. He actively promoted the Car Club and told people
who gave him $5,000 that they could get their money back at any time if they asked to have it
returned. When Watters, Nylund, Hanscom and Spaulding asked McLeod for their money back,
6 There has been a lot o f pyramid activity in this State, all o f which used the “gifting” theme. There are currently
three more cases pending. State o f Maine v. Chad Beauchesne et al. d/b/a Changing Lives (Kennebec Cty. CV-0103) ($2,000 payment by eight Freshmen who are trying to reach the “Senior” level); State o f Maine v. Jacqueline
Abraham et al. d/b/a A Woman’s Project or Women Helping Women (Kennebec Cty. CV-02-88) ($5,000 paid by
eight Appetizers who are trying to reach the “Dessert” level); State o f Maine v. John Neddeau (Washington Cty.
CV-02-02) (eight racing Fans who are trying to reach the “Driver” level).
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he told them that in fact they could not get it back, and that he would not give it back to them.
Therefore, the Defendant McLeod should be assessed a civil penalty of up to $10,000 for
intentionally violating the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this Court issue an Order finding that
the Defendant Theodore McLeod, Jr. violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act, issue an injunction
enjoining him from promoting or participating in the Car Club or any similar scheme that
requires the recruitment of an infinite number of individuals to succeed, order the Defendant to
pay restitution and disgorgement of the money that he made by participating in the Car Club,
order the Defendant to pay a civil penalty, and order the Defendant to pay the State the cost of its
investigation and suit, including its attorneys fees.

Respectfully submitted,
G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

Dated: November 6, 2002
LINDA J. CONTI
Maine Bar Neu 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Public Protection Division
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

THEODORE MCLEOD, JR.,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR
INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER RELIEF

Plaintiff, the State of Maine, by its Attorney General, brings this action against
Defendant, Theodore McLeod, Jr., d/b/a NASCAR Men’s Club, and states as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This action is brought for and on behalf of the State of Maine, by G. Steven

Rowe, its Attorney General, pursuant to the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
(“UTPA”) 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, and his common law authority as Attorney General to
represent the People of the State of Maine.
2.

Venue for this action properly lies in Kennebec County, Maine, pursuant to

5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
PARTIES
3.

Thé Attorney General of the State of Maine, is charged, inter alia, with the

enforcement of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 205-A et seq.
4.

Defendant Theodore McLeod, Jr. (hereafter referred to as “McLeod”), an

individual doing business as NASCAR Men’s Club, resides at the address of Main Road,

Hermon, Maine 04402 and has a mailing address of P.O. Box 6150, Hermon, Maine
04402.
COMMERCE
5.

Subsection 1 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act defines “trade” and

“commerce” as follows:
“Trade” and “commerce” shall include the advertising,
offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any
property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and
any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever
situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or
indirectly affecting the people of this State.
6.

The Defendant was at all times relevant hereto engaged in trade and

commerce in the State of Maine by advertising, promoting, offering for sale, selling and
distributing intangible property, specifically, the right to invest or participate in the
NASCAR Men’s Club.
DEFENDANT’S COURSE OF CONDUCT
A.

Defendant’s Gifting Program
7.

During the Spring of 2001, Defendant was engaged in an unincorporated

business in the State of Maine which he refers to as the “NASCAR Men’s Club”.
8.

Defendant actively solicited and sold the opportunity to participate in the

NASCAR Men’s Club.
9.

Defendant garnered participation in the gifting club by soliciting individuals

to pay $5,000 and receive a position as a “racing fan” on a “board”. Typically, there are
fifteen positions on a board and as an individual moves up the board, he would become a
“driver”. Upon reaching “driver” status, a participant is supposed to receive a return of
$40,000.

?

10.

Participants are paid from the proceeds paid by newly recruited members.

Defendant enticed participants to join this gifting club by promising returns of $40,000.
Defendant’s gifting scheme relies on the recruitment of additional persons to participate,
and the plan requires an infinite number of new members to succeed.
11.

Defendant occasionally hosted and/or encouraged others to host gifting club

meetings.
12.

In his efforts to advance the marketing and sale of his pyramid scheme,

Defendant represented to potential investors that the NASCAR Men’s Club was a legal
method of investing and receiving income without paying any income taxes.
13.

Defendant also routinely represented to potential investors that the

NASCAR Men’s Club was not an illegal pyramid scheme and that attorneys had reviewed
it and determined that it was legal.
14.

The NASCAR Men’s Club is in actuality a pyramid scheme that is an illegal

lottery under Maine law.
15.

NASCAR is an acronym for National Association for Stock Car Auto

Racing. It is a for-profit corporation which has not consented to the use of its trade name
for purposes of promoting the Defendant’s pyramid scheme.
B.

Specific Illustrations of Defendant McLeod’s Conduct
16.

Defendant McLeod’s acts and practices complained of above are ongoing.

In one illustrative, nonexclusive example, on April 2, 2001, five Maine residents gave the
Defendant at least $5,000 each. These participants were told that the scheme was legal and
that they would make money. Relying on this information, they each gave $5,000 to
McLeod.
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17.

These participants have asked Theodore McLeod, Jr. to return their money

and he has refused.
APPLICABLE STATUTES
18.

Pursuant to the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
declared unlawful.

19.

Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1212(1)(B):
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of his business, vocation or occupation, he [c]auses
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or
services.

20.

Pursuant to 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305:
The organization of any multi-level distributorship
arrangement, pyramid club or other group, organized or
brought together under any plan or device whereby fees or
dues or anything of material value to be paid or given by
members thereof are to be paid or given to any other
member thereof who has been required to pay or give
anything of material value for the right to receive such
sums, with the exception of payments based exclusively on
sales of goods or services to persons who are not
participants in the plan and who are not purchasing in order
to participate in the plan, which plan or device includes any
provision for the increase in such membership through a
chain process of new members securing other new
members and thereby advancing themselves in the group to
a position where such members in turn receive fees, dues or
things of material value from other members, is declared to
be a lottery, and whoever shall organize or participate in
any such lottery by organizing or inducing membership in
any such group or organization shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than 11 months, or by both.
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A violation of this section shall constitute a violation of
Title 5, chapter 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act.
VIOLATIONS
COUNT I
(Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act - Deceptive Conduct)
21.

The Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint.

22.

Defendant, in conjunction with his conduct set forth herein above, has

engaged in a course of trade or commerce which constitutes unfair and deceptive conduct
declared unlawful under 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, by representing to Maine participants that the
NASCAR Men’s Club was not illegal when in fact it is a pyramid scheme that is an illegal
lottery in Maine, by falsely representing that the NASCAR Men’s Club is a tax free way to
earn income, and by using the trade name “NASCAR” without permission, falsely
implying that the organization was sponsored by or associated with that entity.
23.

The Defendant’s conduct as described in this Count constitutes deceptive

acts or practices and intentional violations of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.

COUNT II
(Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act - Unlawful Pyramid)
24.

The Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint.

25.

Defendant, in conjunction with his conduct set forth herein above, has

engaged in a course of trade or commerce declared unlawful under 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305, by
selling, offering to sell and attempting to offer to sell the right to participate in a pyramid
sales scheme, namely the NASCAR Men’s Club.
26.

The Defendant’s conduct described in this Count constitutes intentional

violations of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
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REMEDIES
27.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
any person is using or is about to use any method, act or
practice declared by section 207 to be unlawful, and that
proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring
an action in the name of the State against such person to
restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of
such method, act or practice and the court may make such
other orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to
any person who has suffered any ascertainable loss by
reason of the use or employment of such unlawful method,
act or practice, any moneys or property, real or personal,
which may have been acquired by means of such method,
act or practice.

28.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 also provides that each intentional violation of section 207

in which the Attorney General establishes that the conduct giving rise to the violation is
either unfair or deceptive is a violation for which a civil penalty of not more than $10,000
shall be adjudged.
29.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 provides that in any action under this section where a

permanent injunction is issued, the court may order the person against whom the permanent
injunction has been issued to pay the State the costs of the investigation of that person by
the Attorney General and the costs of the suit.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests this honorable Court enter an order:
A.

Finding that the Defendant has violated 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, the Maine Unfair

Trade Practices Act, by making misrepresentations to consumers regarding the NASCAR
Men’s Club;
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B.

Finding that the Defendant has violated 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305 by selling an

illegal pyramid;
C.

Permanently enjoining Defendant from engaging in the business of

advertising, marketing, distributing, selling and offering to sell a right to participate in a
pyramid sales scheme in the State of Maine in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act;
D.

Declaring that all contracts entered into between Defendant and Maine

consumers by the use of methods and practices declared unlawful are rescinded and
requiring Defendant to disgorge all funds received through the NASCAR Men’s Club;
E.

Assessing a civil penalty in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000)

per intentional violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act;
F.

Requiring Defendant to pay all costs and attorneys fees for the prosecution

and investigation of this action, as provided by 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act; and
G.

Providing such other and further equitable relief as justice and equity may

require, including an accounting of all moneys collected and expended by Defendant in
connection with the NASCAR Men’s Club.

G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General of Maine
FRANCIS ACKERMAN
Chief, Public Protection Division

Dated: August 14, 2001
Maine Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
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Public Protection Division
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-01-174

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.

DECISION ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THEODORE McLEOD, JR.,
D efendant

This m atter came before the court for hearing on the plaintiff's m otion for
sum m ary judgm ent. After considering the parties' statem ents of m aterial fact and
m em oranda, the court w ill deny the motion.
The w ater is m uddied a bit by the defendant's failure to m eet the
requirem ents of M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(3) & (4). The defendant failed to reply to the
plaintiff's statem ent of m aterial facts in a m anner that w ould "admit, deny or
qualify such additional facts by reference to the num bered paragraphs of the
opposing party's statem ent of m aterial facts and unless a fact is adm itted, shall
support each denial or qualification by a record citation." (3). As a result, the
plaintiff's statem ent of m aterial fact should be considered as adm itted. However,
the court will not accept as adm itted the facts set forth in paragraphs 19-29 because
they are supported only by a perm issible inference from the defendant's invocation
of his Fifth A m endm ent rights rath er than sw orn testim ony. The court declines to
draw that inference for purposes of this motion for sum m ary judgm ent.

1

The defendant also failed to present any statem ent of additional facts, filing
instead a list of factual issues which he claims rem ain to be tried. However, it is
clear that his list of material issues which rem ain in dispute are based upon his own
affidavit, which the court has m ore leeway in accepting under subsection (4). The
defendant's statements in his affidavit are no t contrary to his prior deposition
testim ony since at that point in the proceedings the defendant essentially refused to
testify, asserting his Fifth A m endm ent privilege. This w ould not prevent
consideration of the affidavit statements. In sum m ary, there rem ain m aterial facts
at issue, prim arily concerning the defendant's role in the so-called NASCAR Club,
sufficient to defeat the m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Therefore, the entry will be:
Motion DENIED.

Dated: May

<*7

. 2002
S. Kirk stuctstrup
Justice, Superior C ourt
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-OI

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
THEODORE MCLEOD, JR.,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT FOR
INJUNCTIVE AND OTHER RELIEF

Plaintiff, the State of Maine, by its Attorney General, brings this action against
Defendant, Theodore McLeod, Jr., d/b/a NASCAR Men’s Club, and states as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This action is brought for and on behalf of the State of Maine, by G. Steven

Rowe, its Attorney General, pursuant to the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
(“UTPA”) 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, and his common law authority as Attorney General to
represent the People of the State of Maine.
2.

Venue for this action properly lies in Kennebec County, Maine, pursuant to

5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
PARTIES
3.

The Attorney General of the State of Maine, is charged, inter alia, with the

enforcement of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 205-A et seq.
4.

Defendant Theodore McLeod, Jr. (hereafter referred to as “McLeod”), an

individual doing business as NASCAR Men’s Club, resides at the address of Main Road,

Hermon, Maine 04402 and has a mailing address of P.O. Box 6150, Hermon, Maine
04402.
COMMERCE
5.

Subsection 1 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act defines “trade” and

“commerce” as follows:
“Trade” and “commerce” shall include the advertising,
offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any
property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and
any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever
situate, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or
indirectly affecting the people of this State.
6.

The Defendant was at all times relevant hereto engaged in trade and

commerce in the State of Maine by advertising, promoting, offering for sale, selling and
distributing intangible property, specifically, the right to invest or participate in the
NASCAR Men’s Club.
DEFENDANT’S COURSE OF CONDUCT
A.

Defendant’s Gifting Program
7.

During the Spring of 2001, Defendant was engaged in an unincorporated

business in the State of Maine which he refers to as the “NASCAR Men’s Club”.
8.

Defendant actively solicited and sold the opportunity to participate in the

NASCAR Men’s Club.
9.

Defendant garnered participation in the gifting club by soliciting individuals

to pay $5,000 and receive a position as a “racing fan” on a “board”. Typically, there are
fifteen positions on a board and as an individual moves up the board, he would become a
“driver”. Upon reaching “driver” status, a participant is supposed to receive a return of
$40,000.

?

10.

Participants are paid from the proceeds paid by newly recruited members.

Defendant enticed participants to join this gifting club by promising returns of $40,000.
Defendant’s gifting scheme relies on the recruitment of additional persons to participate,
and the plan requires an infinite number of new members to succeed.
11.

Defendant occasionally hosted and/or encouraged others to host gifting club

meetings.
12.

In his efforts to advance the marketing and sale of his pyramid scheme,

Defendant represented to potential investors that the NASCAR Men’s Club was a legal
method of investing and receiving income without paying any income taxes.
13.

Defendant also routinely represented to potential investors that the

NASCAR Men’s Club was not an illegal pyramid scheme and that attorneys had reviewed
it and determined that it was legal.
14.

The NASCAR Men’s Club is in actuality a pyramid scheme that is an illegal

lottery under Maine law.
15.

NASCAR is an acronym for National Association for Stock Car Auto

Racing. It is a for-profit corporation which has not consented to the use of its trade name
for purposes of promoting the Defendant’s pyramid scheme.
B.

Specific Illustrations of Defendant McLeod’s Conduct
16.

Defendant McLeod’s acts and practices complained of above are ongoing.

In one illustrative, nonexclusive example, on April 2, 2001, five Maine residents gave the
Defendant at least $5,000 each. These participants were told that the scheme was legal and
that they would make money. Relying on this information, they each gave $5,000 to
McLeod.
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17.

These participants have asked Theodore McLeod, Jr. to return their money

and he has refused.
APPLICABLE STATUTES
18.

Pursuant to the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
declared unlawful.

19.

Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1212(1)(B):
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of his business, vocation or occupation, he [c]auses
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or
services.

20.

Pursuant to 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305:
The organization of any multi-level distributorship
arrangement, pyramid club or other group, organized or
brought together under any plan or device whereby fees or
dues or anything of material value to be paid or given by
members thereof are to be paid or given to any other
member thereof who has been required to pay or give
anything of material value for the right to receive such
sums, with the exception of payments based exclusively on
sales of goods or services to persons who are not
participants in the plan and who are not purchasing in order
to participate in the plan, which plan or device includes any
provision for the increase in such membership through a
chain process of new members securing other new
members and thereby advancing themselves in the group to
a position where such members in turn receive fees, dues or
things of material value from other members, is declared to
be a lottery, and whoever shall organize or participate in
any such lottery by organizing or inducing membership in
any such group or organization shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than 11 months, or by both.
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A violation of this section shall constitute a violation of
Title 5, chapter 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act.
VIOLATIONS
COUNT I
(Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act - Deceptive Conduct)
21.

The Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint.

22.

Defendant, in conjunction with his conduct set forth herein above, has

engaged in a course of trade or commerce which constitutes unfair and deceptive conduct
declared unlawful under 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, by representing to Maine participants that the
NASCAR Men’s Club was not illegal when in fact it is a pyramid scheme that is an illegal
lottery in Maine, by falsely representing that the NASCAR Men’s Club is a tax free way to
earn income, and by using the trade name “NASCAR” without permission, falsely
implying that the organization was sponsored by or associated with that entity.
23.

The Defendant’s conduct as described in this Count constitutes deceptive

acts or practices and intentional violations of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.

COUNT II
(Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act - Unlawful Pyramid)
24.

The Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint.

25.

Defendant, in conjunction with his conduct set forth herein above, has

engaged in a course of trade or commerce declared unlawful under 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305, by
selling, offering to sell and attempting to offer to sell the right to participate in a pyramid
sales scheme, namely the NASCAR Men’s Club.
26.

The Defendant’s conduct described in this Count constitutes intentional

violations of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.

REMEDIES
27.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
any person is using or is about to use any method, act or
practice declared by section 207 to be unlawful, and that
proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring
an action in the name of the State against such person to
restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of
such method, act or practice and the court may make such
other orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to.
any person who has suffered any ascertainable loss by
reason of the use or employment of such unlawful method,
act or practice, any moneys or property, real or personal,
which may have been acquired by means of such method,
act or practice.

28.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 also provides that each intentional violation of section 207

in which the Attorney General establishes that the conduct giving rise to the violation is
either unfair or deceptive is a violation for which a civil penalty of not more than $10,000
shall be adjudged.
29.

5 M.R.S.A. § 209 provides that in any action under this section where a

permanent injunction is issued, the court may order the person against whom the permanent
injunction has been issued to pay the State the costs of the investigation of that person by
the Attorney General and the costs of the suit.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests this honorable Court enter an order:
A.

Finding that the Defendant has violated 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, the Maine Unfair

Trade Practices Act, by making misrepresentations to consumers regarding the NASCAR
Men’s Club;
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B.

Finding that the Defendant has violated 17 M.R.S.A. § 2305 by selling an

illegal pyramid;
C.

Permanently enjoining Defendant from engaging in the business of

advertising, marketing, distributing, selling and offering to sell a right to participate in a
pyramid sales scheme in the State of Maine in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act;
D.

Declaring that all contracts entered into between Defendant and Maine

consumers by the use of methods and practices declared unlawful are rescinded and
requiring Defendant to disgorge all funds received through the NASCAR Men’s Club;
E.

Assessing a civil penalty in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000)

per intentional violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act;
F.

Requiring Defendant to pay all costs and attorneys fees for the prosecution

and investigation of this action, as provided by 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act; and
G.

Providing such other and further equitable relief as justice and equity may

require, including an accounting of all moneys collected and expended by Defendant in
connection with the NASCAR Men’s Club.

G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General of Maine
FRANCIS ACKERMAN
Chief, Public Protection Division

Dated: August 14, 2001
Maine Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
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Public Protection Division
Maine Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
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